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Accomplishments in Juvenile Probation in California Over the Last Decade

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OVER THE PAST ten years, probation departments across the state of California have seen important changes in the way they do business. Beginning with Title IV-A-EA in 1993, departments began a system-wide “sea change” from a focus on suppression, enforcement, and monitoring of youthful offenders to a focus on families and on rehabilitative and therapeutic approaches (Turner, et al., 2003). With the Comprehensive Youth Services Act/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (CYSA/TANF) essentially replacing the Title IV-A-EA program in 1995, training conducted by departments on the 23 CYSA/TANF-eligible services and objectives helped to reinforce this message to line staff working directly with youths. ¹

CYSA/TANF also affected the local county contexts in which probation departments operate. One of the requirements of the CYSA/TANF legislation was that departments undertake a formal planning process that included the input of key agencies, service providers, and community groups involved in juvenile and children’s issues in the county. This increased the likelihood that CYSA/TANF funds would be used to address identified service delivery gaps within the counties and that CYSA/TANF funded programs would fit into a larger overall county plan for addressing children’s needs. CYSA/TANF helped encourage coordination with, and collaboration between, probation and other county agencies and local service providers by providing funding to bring all parties to the table. In addition, CYSA’s mandate that federal TANF funds be used to encourage the development of interagency family case plans, to address multiple needs of families, and to use available community resources to provide services to this population contributed to this increase in coordination and collaboration. Finally, CYSA/TANF enabled probation to become a more viable player in the county with respect to children’s issues in general, with CYSA/TANF funds serving as a key incentive for other agencies and service providers to partner with probation in addressing these issues.

There were also other factors at work. Prior to and contemporaneous with CYSA/TANF, other grant programs (e.g., Juvenile Challenge Initiative) also required as a condition of funding that

multi-agency planning bodies be formed, and mandated collaboration as a term of the award. Taken together, the effects of these programs has been to increasingly foster a system-wide approach to addressing juvenile issues at the local level.

Despite the acknowledgment of the importance of these efforts, no integrated description of these and other probation initiatives exists; nor have analyses of the potential impact of this “sea change” on youth outcomes been examined. This article addresses this gap.

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Methods Used

This analysis is primarily descriptive. Our task was to describe major probation initiatives during the past decade and to link these efforts with potential impacts on youth crime and other outcomes. The initiatives under study include the Juvenile Crime Enforcement and Accountability Challenge Grant Program, CYSA/TANF, the Repeat Offender Prevention Program (ROPP) and the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA).

Such an endeavor is difficult for a variety of reasons. We did not have the opportunity to “hold everything else constant” to measure the impacts of such changes. Many other changes relevant to youths’ lives have occurred over the past decade in California, including major economic changes in the state, immigration policies, and perceptions of personal safety. For example, the ethnic mix of youths in California has changed dramatically over the past decade. The Hispanic population under age 20 increased by 27 percent from 1994 to 2003, while white and black populations of the same ages decreased (by 12 percent for whites and 8 percent for blacks). ² Another example is unemployment in California, which declined from an annual average of 8.6 percent in 1994 to a low of 5.0 percent in 2000, but by 2003 had risen again to 6.8 percent. ³

Our description of probation initiatives is gathered based on available documentation from literature searches, and information provided by the Chief Probation Officers of California (CPOC) and by individual county agencies on:

- Legislative background
- Goals
- Services provided
- Target groups
- Interagency collaborations
- Funding levels

Information about probation initiatives comes primarily from program descriptions and reports of outcomes issued by the California Board of Corrections (BOC). Information about the CYSA/TANF initiative is taken from the RAND evaluation of the program (Turner, et al., 2003).

Our data on outcomes are drawn from publicly available sources such as the census, FBI crime rates, and information gathered and reported by the California Board of Corrections. In general, we attempted to gather data covering a decade, usually from 1994 through 2003. In some instances data were available only for a limited time (e.g., data on completion of high school were available only for selected years between 1990 and 2000). In addition, whenever possible we have obtained comparable data for the U.S. as a whole in order to provide a baseline for examining California trends.

Although we will not be able to draw firm conclusions regarding the impact of initiatives on outcomes, we can note the temporal proximity between initiatives and outcomes that might suggest how the initiatives impacted youths and their families. ⁴ Other states that have invested more, or less, than California in probation initiatives may show similar trends to those in California over the same time period. To the extent that we see similar outcome trends but dissimilar patterns of probation initiatives across different states, observed changes may be part of a national trend rather than the result of California initiatives

Youths Involved in California's Juvenile Justice System

The juvenile correctional system in California comprises several options for youths in California, including formal and informal probation, confinement in juvenile hall, assignment to juvenile ranch or camp, transfer to the California Youth Authority (CYA), and transfer to adult court for disposition. A large number of youths are involved in the system. Youths can be referred to probation in California through several sources—law enforcement, schools, parents, or other community agencies. In 2003, 50 of the 58 California counties reported a total of 154,954 youths referred to probation (California Attorney General, 2005). In the same year, the standing population in the halls was 6,434 youths. An additional 4,466 youths were in camps. The CYA institutional population at year-end 2003 was 4,534. Probation is the agency responsible for all these youths, with the exception of offenders sentenced to the CYA. Probation is the linchpin in county juvenile justice systems, collaborating with all the stakeholders as a youth moves through the system (Administrative Office of the Courts, 2003).

Programs and Initiatives

Title IV-A-EA

Title IV-A of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, established Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. California's Department of Social Services, through the state's Health and Human Services Agency, administered the AFDC program in the state and determined how Title IV-A funds were spent (California Department of Social Services, 2005). All youths who were removed from their homes by a court order were potentially entitled to participate in the Emergency Assistance (EA) program of Title IV-A (Chief Probation Officers of California, 2005). California probation departments claimed reimbursement for eligible expenses under the Title IV-A-EA program from July 1993 through December 1995. Title IV-A-EA funding for county probation departments was approximately \$150 million in fiscal year (FY) 1994/1995 and \$120 million in FY 1995/1996 (Turner, et al., 2003). Under Title IV-A-EA funding, probation departments began adding services aimed at reducing juvenile crime. Examples include case management services, gang intervention programs, and parenting skills training.

Juvenile Crime Enforcement and Accountability Challenge Grant Program

In 1996 the California Legislature initiated the Juvenile Crime Enforcement and Accountability Challenge Grant Program as a major effort to determine what approaches were effective in reducing juvenile crime. The initial Challenge Grant provided \$50 million to help counties identify, implement, and evaluate locally developed community-based projects that targeted at-risk youths and young offenders. During the first 18 months of the Challenge Grant program, the BOC awarded over \$45.9 million in demonstration grants to 14 California counties. In 1998, the Legislature amended the Challenge Grant legislation and provided \$60 million in additional funding for new demonstration grants. Of the \$60 million allocated by the Legislature, the BOC awarded over \$56 million in three-year grants to 17 counties. County projects included a broad spectrum of interventions, and served more than 5,300 at-risk youths and juvenile offenders (California Board of Corrections, 2004a).

The BOC's mandated report to the Legislature on the Challenge Grant II program noted that results varied by age and gender. The projects had a significant impact on males 15 years of age and older by reducing arrests, reducing felony arrests, and increasing the rate of successfully completing probation (California Board of Corrections, 2004a, p. 12). The projects also made a highly significant difference in juvenile justice outcomes for older youths, both males and females, when the risk factor of substance abuse is taken into account (California Board of Corrections, 2004a, p. 12). However, an evaluation of the effects of Challenge funding on *overall*

crime rates in counties—not just improvements for program participants contrasted with similar youths not receiving the programs—revealed little or no overall reduction in arrests (Worrall, 2004).

Repeat Offender Prevention Program

Repeat Offender Prevention Program (ROPP) was one of several initiatives undertaken by the Legislature in 1994 to respond to rising juvenile crime rates. ROPP funding began in FY1996/1997 and helped support six-year demonstration projects in seven counties. An eighth county (San Francisco) also took part in the last four years. The annual allocation for ROPP was \$3.8 million. Each county developed its own program or programs, with an emphasis on a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency team-oriented approach. The fiscal year 2000/2001 state budget not only provided funding for existing ROPP programs, but also provided \$5.7 million to support first year start-up activities for new projects and directed the BOC to award grants on a competitive basis. The BOC awarded available funds to eight counties, which are referred to as ROPP II (California Board of Corrections, 2002).

In its mandated report to the Legislature on the ROPP (which included only the eight counties originally funded), the BOC reported that nearly 1,800 juveniles received services under ROPP. The BOC also reported that ROPP juveniles attended significantly more days of school, improved their grade point average, and were less likely to fall below grade level. ROPP projects also significantly increased the rate at which juveniles successfully completed restitution and community service, and reduced the percentage of positive drug tests. Significantly fewer ROPP youths were on warrant status (California Board of Corrections, 2002).

Comprehensive Youth Services Act/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families

When the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) was enacted, it created a new welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). The Welfare-to-Work Act of 1997, which implemented TANF in California, replacing the state's AFDC with the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) program and also created another program, the Comprehensive Youth Services Act (CYSA), which was enacted in FY 1997/1998, to fund juvenile probation services. California's allocation of PRWORA funds was increased initially by \$141 million in the first year and \$168 million in subsequent years, based upon probation departments' claiming for services provided. Counties began CYSA implementation in FY 1997/1998. Counties used CYSA/TANF to fund services and programs across the continuum of options, from prevention/early intervention through custody (Turner, et al., 2003).

Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act

In 2000, the California Legislature passed the Schiff-Cardenas Crime Prevention Act, which authorized funding for county juvenile justice programs and designated the BOC as the administrator of funding. A 2001 Senate bill extended the funding and changed the program's name to the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA). This effort was designed to provide a stable funding source to counties for juvenile programs that have been proven effective in curbing crime among at-risk and young offenders. JJCPA currently supports 193 collaborative programs implemented in 56 counties to address locally identified needs in the continuum of responses to juvenile crime. Budget allocation for JJCPA was \$121 million for the first year of the program. Counties reported that 98,703 minors participated in JJCPA programs during the first year of the program. JJCPA program youths had a lower arrest rate than minors in the comparison group. Completion of restitution and community service rates were higher for JJCPA juveniles (California Board of Corrections, 2003). An additional \$116.3 million was allocated for the second year of JJCPA programs, during which 110,658 at-risk youths and young offenders received services. Second-year JJCPA youths had lower arrest and incarceration rates than comparison group youths, and more JJCPA youths completed court-ordered community service than comparison group youths (California Board of Corrections, 2004b). In its third year, \$116.3 million was allocated for JJCPA funding, and 106,055 youths were served through JJCPA

programs. Fewer third-year JJCPA youths were arrested than comparison youths, and more successfully completed probation and court-ordered community service (California Board of Corrections, 2005).

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Indicators of Change

Juvenile Population

California's juvenile population, i.e., persons aged between 10 and 17, grew more than twice as rapidly from 1994 through 2003 than the national average. In California, the increase was from 3,509,800 in 1994 to 4,519,800 in 2003, an increase of 29 percent. Comparable national numbers were 29,452,456 in 1994 and 33,498,951 in 2003, a gain of only 14 percent. [5](#)

Criminal Justice Indicators

Juvenile Arrest Rates. Perhaps the most widely quoted indicator of crime is arrest rate. Juvenile arrest rates have been declining steadily in California over the most recent ten years for which data are available. Overall, juvenile arrests have also dropped for the U.S. as a whole. While national rates declined more than did California's rate from 1996 through 2001, the national rate actually rose in 2002. Arrests per 100,000 juveniles for felony or misdemeanor offenses in California have fallen from 6,550 in 1994 to 4,228 in 2003, a decline of 35 percent. The decline has been more pronounced since 1998. [6](#)

Adult and juvenile arrest rates were virtually identical in California from 1994 through 1999, but beginning in 2000, juvenile rates declined more steeply than did the adult rates. While we cannot draw any definitive conclusions, we note that the timing of the improvement of juvenile arrest rates, relative to adult arrest rates, coincides with California's large initiatives aimed at reducing juvenile crime. [7](#)

Juvenile Incarceration Rates. Like arrest rates, juvenile incarceration rates dropped sharply over the ten-year reference period, from 109.0 per 100,000 juveniles in 1994, to 32.4 per 100,000 in 2003, a decline of 70 percent over ten years. The decline was not uniform, with incarcerations increasing slightly from 1994 to 1995 and again from 1997 to 1998. In all other years, however, the rate was lower than in the previous year, and the decline between 1995 and 1997 was particularly steep. [8](#)

California Youth Authority. First admissions make up roughly 85 percent of all admissions to the CYA in any given year, and the average stay is roughly three years. New admissions declined from 3,640 in 1993 to 1,310 in 2002, a drop of 64 percent. However, some of this decline is most likely due to the fact that in 1997, the fee structure for charging counties for CYA commitments changed, giving counties an incentive to use county-based placements for lower level offenders rather than send them to CYA. The standing population of CYA youths also fell over the same period of time, from 8,556 in 1993 to 5,954 in 2002, a 30 percent decline. [9](#)

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Juvenile Camps, Ranches, and Halls

Since 1999, the BOC has surveyed juvenile detention facilities in California on a monthly basis, and has issued quarterly reports that include information about juvenile population in ranches and camps, as well as in juvenile halls. Between the beginning of 1999 and the end of the third quarter of 2004, the standing population in ranches and camps has declined from 4,869 to 4,260, a 13 percent drop. During the same period of time, juvenile hall populations also fell by 9 percent, from 6,980 at the beginning of 1999 to 6,335 in the third quarter of 2004. [10](#)

Non-Criminal Justice Indicators

In addition to measures of arrest and incarceration rates, we examined trends in other aspects of juvenile life that may have potentially been influenced by recent county probation initiatives. We chose the non-criminal justice indicators to reflect goals of the initiatives as well as indicators for which we could obtain data for California and the nation. For example, goals of CYSA/TANF included the reduction of the number of out-of-wedlock births and reduction in the use of governmental benefits by families. Challenge required information on school measures. JJCPA programs collect information on school outcomes in many counties. We were not able to find exact data to match initiative goals and outcomes, but were able to examine trends in teen pregnancy rates, percentage of children living in poverty, and rates of completion of high school.

Teen Birth Rates. The teen birth rate in California declined from 71.3 per 1,000 females aged 15 to 19 in 1993, to 41.4 in 2002, a drop of 42 percent over a ten-year period. The decline was gradual throughout the period. For the U.S. as a whole, the decline was less than in California, going from 59.0 per 1,000 females aged 15 to 19 in 1993 to 43.0 in 2002, a drop of 27 percent. After having a higher teen birth rate than the national average from 1994 through 1999, California had a lower rate than the country as a whole from 2000 through 2002. [11](#)

Children Living in Poverty. The percentage of children living in poverty declined somewhat between 1994 and 2002, [12](#) both in California and in the U.S. as a whole. In 1994, 50.3 percent of children in California were living at or below 200 percent poverty. By 2002, the percentage had declined to 41.2 percent of children, a decline of 18 percent. During the same period, the U.S. rates declined from 43.8 percent to 38.2 percent, a drop of 13 percent. [13](#)

In 1994, 13.4 percent of California children in poverty were also without health insurance. By 2002, that number had fallen to 8.8 percent, a decline of 34 percent. The comparable figures for the U.S. as a whole declined from 9.7 percent to 7.5 percent during the same time period, a fall of 23 percent. [14](#)

Completion of High School. Data on rates of high school graduation among persons aged 18 to 24 are available only in three-year averages for the years 1990–1992, 1994–1996, and 1998–2000. During that time, California’s graduation rate has increased from 77.3 percent to 82.5 percent. The U.S. average, by contrast, has remained unchanged at 85.7 percent for the same period. [15](#)

Summary of Outcome Findings

In summary, we have seen arrest rates for juveniles declining at the same time probation referrals and incarcerations were dropping. Teen birth rates have dropped and the number of children living in poverty has improved, as have high school graduation rates. Many of the same patterns seen in California over the past ten years are similar to those in the U.S. as a whole, although we see somewhat larger changes for California on some measures. Similar patterns for the state and nation raise the question of whether such trends may be driven by factors operating on a national, rather than a state, level.

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Comparing California to Other States

In order to put California’s trends in perspective, we looked at states that were somewhat comparable in their approach to probation, yet differed in some important dimensions as well. Unfortunately, the only reliable available indicators of change across states are juvenile arrest rates, so we will confine our analysis to arrest trends.

Using FY 1998 budgets published by the National Association of State Budget Officers [16](#) and U.S. Census estimates of juvenile population in each state, we calculated per capita juvenile justice expenditures in states where probation was decentralized rather than administered at the state level. Of the 18 such states, we selected 7 large states for comparison: Colorado, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. In FY 1998, California budgeted \$172 to

juvenile justice for each person aged 10 to 17 in the state. Some of the comparison states spent more per juvenile than California, some spent less, and some had a comparable budget. We note also that recent initiatives may have changed juvenile justice allocations significantly since FY 1998 in some states. In addition, the use of per capita expenditures may mask important differences in how states allocate their resources—either for community-based or custody institutions.

We will now briefly describe the approach each comparison state has taken in organizing and administering its juvenile justice services, with an emphasis on recent initiatives. We draw these descriptions from individual state profiles compiled by the National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ).

States with Lower Per Capita Spending Than California

Illinois. In FY 1998, the Illinois state budget for juvenile justice was \$66 per juvenile, less than half what California spent. In recent years, the state has changed its approach to juvenile justice to emphasize rehabilitation. In 1998, Illinois codified “formal station adjustments,” which are similar to California’s “delayed entry of judgment,” increasing parental involvement in the juvenile’s rehabilitation and adding conditions such as curfew, youth court, mediation, and community service in lieu of formal probation. In 2003, Illinois established a pilot program called “Redeploy Illinois,” using fiscal incentives to encourage counties to provide services to nonviolent juvenile offenders at the local level rather than in the state correctional system. As of 2003, Illinois also operates 91 youth courts for first-time nonviolent offenders (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2005a).

Texas. In FY 1998, Texas spent \$68 per juvenile on juvenile justice. Since 2001, Texas has been targeting juvenile offenders with mental health needs in their Special Needs Diversionary Program, and evaluations have shown the program to be effective in limiting out-of-home placements for these youths, as well as reducing costs compared to higher-rate residential rates. Like Illinois, Texas has also attempted to increase parental involvement, giving parents an opportunity for input that judges may consider in making disposition decisions (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2005b).

Juvenile Arrest Rates. Juvenile arrest rates have fallen in Illinois and Texas over the past decade, just as they have in California. At the beginning of the decade, Illinois had a lower juvenile arrest rate than California, while the rate in Texas was higher. The same was true at the end of the decade, and the rates of reduction were comparable in the three states.

States with Per Capita Spending Comparable to That of California

New York. The state of New York budgeted \$135 per juvenile in FY 1998. In recent years, the state has placed increased emphasis on comprehensive assessment of risk and needs for juvenile offenders, and on the goal of balanced and restorative justice. A customized form of the Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument (YASI) is being utilized by an increasing number of counties. Driven in part by the increasing number of detentions, Erie and Albany Counties have also collaborated with the Office of Children and Family Services (OFCS) to develop alternatives to detention. Unlike in California, New York courts cannot directly place juveniles in local or private residential facilities. Youthful offenders are instead placed with OFCS, which operates all juvenile facilities (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2005c).

Colorado. Colorado spent an average of \$128 per juvenile in FY 1998 on juvenile justice programs. The state’s Youthful Offender System (YOS) operates as a middle ground between adult prison and the juvenile system for serious youthful offenders, somewhat similar to California’s CYA, but YOS utilizes behavioral redirection, short-term boot camp, structured residential placement, and educational programs. In addition, several Colorado communities have established Multi-agency assessment centers, which offer detention screening and a thorough assessment to determine appropriate interventions and support (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2005d).

Ohio. Ohio, which budgeted \$153 per state juvenile in FY 1998, has initiated policies that give fiscal incentives to juvenile courts to develop local community-based disposition programs or to contract with community-based organizations to provide these services. Youths at risk of expulsion and first-time misdemeanor offenders are often referred to diversion programs, which may include community service, truancy services, electronic monitoring, mediation, and unofficial probation. Some Ohio counties also use teen courts as a diversion program (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2005e).

Juvenile Arrest Rates. Arrest rates per 100,000 juveniles have declined in each of the comparison states over the past decade, although the patterns are not identical. While California's decrease has been steady, New York saw a dramatic fall in juvenile arrests between 1995 and 1997, and continues to have the lowest juvenile arrest rate among states with budgets comparable to that of California. Despite a spike in rates in 1996, Ohio's pattern has been similar to California's, although rates have been lower in Ohio throughout the decade than in California. Colorado's juvenile arrest rates have been consistently higher than California's, and the most significant drop in Colorado's rates have occurred since 2000.

States with Higher Per Capita Spending Than California

Oregon. Oregon, which spent \$274 on juvenile justice for each youth in FY 1998, responded to an all-time high juvenile arrest rate in 1996 by adopting the Juvenile Crime Prevention (JCP) programs, aimed at preventing high-risk youths from committing or repeating offenses. Youths are targeted based on problems in at least two areas among school, peer, behavior, family, and substance use. Services include direct interventions (such as substance abuse treatment, tutoring, or family counseling), case management (including coordinated review and monitoring of a youth's needs and services), and support services (including the provision of basic needs services, such as housing assistance or medical assistance). Evaluation of JCP has shown its effectiveness in reducing recidivism (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2005f; Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, 2003).

Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania budgeted \$343 per state juvenile in FY 1998, the highest rate of any state. A 1976 state law provides financial incentives to counties to expand the range of community-based services rather than rely on state institutions. As a result, there are more than 500 programs for delinquent youths in Pennsylvania. A 1995 law established balanced and restorative justice as the state's model for juvenile justice. Unlike most states, district attorneys' offices and juvenile probation departments are responsible for providing services for crime victims. Specialized probation includes community-based, school-based, intensive, aftercare, and substance abuse programs (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2005g).

Juvenile Arrest Rates. After peaking in 1996, juvenile arrest rates have fallen substantially in Oregon, although they still remain higher than comparable rates in California. Despite its massive spending on juvenile justice and its emphasis on community-based programs, Pennsylvania is one of the few states in the country to see a recent increase in its juvenile arrest rate, beginning in 1999.

Summary of Comparison State Juvenile Arrest Rates

An examination of our comparison states shows that each of these states—with the notable exception of Pennsylvania—experienced reductions in juvenile arrest rates over the past decade. All have instigated new initiatives during the decade in attempting to curb juvenile crime, but we are not able to directly link the initiatives to the reduction in arrest rates in any state, including California. Some comparison states started and ended with higher rates than California, while others started and ended with lower rates than California. Only Pennsylvania saw an actual increase in juvenile arrest rates, despite the country's highest per capita juvenile budget in the country.

There seems to be little connection between the amount of a state's budget for juvenile justice and the change in its juvenile arrest rate. Although rates in Oregon and Pennsylvania suggest that

large juvenile justice expenditures may be the result of high rates of juvenile crime, the difference in arrest patterns between Oregon and Pennsylvania suggest that budget alone is not the determining factor in reducing juvenile arrests.

It may be significant that although Pennsylvania spends more on juvenile justice than any other state, it has not launched major new initiatives over the past decade, but only continued the same approach it has used since 1976. Every other comparison state, by contrast, has recently initiated new programs. Although no two states have offered identical initiatives, a general pattern of increasing local community-based, often multi-agency, approaches targeting at-risk youths and first-time nonviolent offenders is apparent. Several states, including California, have also embraced an emphasis on balanced and restorative justice.

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Conclusions

Overall, juvenile arrests and incarcerations in California have fallen over the past ten years, even as admissions to CYA dropped significantly and more juveniles were serviced locally. In addition to criminal justice outcomes, teen pregnancy rates have dropped, the numbers of youths living below the poverty level has gone down, and graduation rates have increased. These positive measures are concomitant with probation initiatives. But does this mean that probation programs were responsible for these positive changes in youths' lives? This is a difficult question to answer definitively.

Over the past decade, California youths have shown higher overall rates on most criminal justice and non-criminal justice measures than those of U.S. youths taken as a whole. California's trend on many measures mirrors nationwide trends, suggesting that something other than these initiatives may be at work. For example, the economy in California and nationwide (as measured by unemployment rates) improved during much of the decade examined. However, on certain measures, such as arrest rates and teen pregnancy rates, the decline over the past decade has been greater for California youths than for U.S. youths as a whole. This suggests that California benefited from unique influences, which may include differences in demographic trends or the programs and initiatives for juveniles begun in California over the last decade. When we compared California with seven other large decentralized states, we found that each of these states—with the notable exception of Pennsylvania—experienced reductions in juvenile arrest rates over the past decade. All except Pennsylvania have instigated new initiatives during the decade in attempting to curb juvenile crime, but we are not able to directly link the initiatives to the reduction in arrest rates in any state, including California.

It is important to note, however, that statewide evaluations of recent initiatives in California have shown that criminal justice outcomes for program participants have generally been better than those for youths in routine probation programming, indicating the importance of this type of programming for at-risk and probation youths in California. Our ability to understand how the delivery of different services under these initiatives impacts youth justice and non-justice outcomes could be enhanced if better data were available on the types of youths who participated in the programs and the services that they received. With these data we could more definitively point to the program components that seem to make the most difference for youths with different needs.

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Restorative Circles—A Reentry Planning Process for Hawaii Inmates

¹ This study was comprised of male inmates; however, the program is suitable for female inmates as well. In 2006 it will be expanded to a women's medium security prison.

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The Effect of Gender on the Judicial Pretrial Decision of Bail Amount Set

¹ Nebraska felony classifications and concomitant punishments for each:

Class I Death

Class IA Life imprisonment

Class IB Maximum life imprisonment; Minimum- twenty years imprisonment

Class IC Maximum-fifty years imprisonment; Mandatory minimum—five years imprisonment

Class ID Maximum-fifty years imprisonment; Mandatory minimum—three years imprisonment

Class II Maximum-fifty years imprisonment; Minimum—one year imprisonment.

Class III Maximum—twenty years imprisonment, or twenty-five thousand dollars fine, or both; Minimum—none

Class IV Maximum—five years imprisonment, or \$1000.00 dollars fine, or both; Minimum—none.

Revised Statutes of Nebraska Annotated, 1995, Chapter 28, Section 105.

² Lancaster County utilizes the public defender system for representation of indigent defendants.

³ Because there were so few female defendants who were not white or African American, only white or African American defendants are included in this regression. Of those not considered, one was Asian, two were Native American, and four were Hispanic.

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Accomplishments in Juvenile Probation in California Over the Last Decade

¹ In addition to creating a new welfare program in California-the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) program-the Welfare-to-Work Act of 1997 also created another new state program: CYSA, which was enacted in fiscal year (FY) 1997/1998 to fund juvenile probation services. The CYSA had three basic goals: (1) keep probation youths from further crime, (2) help probation and at-risk youths develop essential skills to avoid dependence on public assistance (Section 18220(j) WIC, or Welfare Institutional Code), and (3) help achieve four overarching federal TANF goals: (a) provide assistance to families so youths may be cared for in their homes; (b) reduce dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (c) encourage formation/maintenance of two-parent families; and (d) prevent/reduce incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies.

² Source: <http://ca.rand.org/stats/popdemo/popraceageUS.html> .

³ Source: <http://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/cgi/dataanalysis/AreaSelection.asp?tableName=Labforce>.

⁴ In addition to the changes in probation, we note that other factors in the same time frame

may have influenced changes in youth behaviors and criminal justice outcomes, both in California and at the national level. These factors include economic trends, increases in the numbers of police officers provided by the federal Community Oriented Policing program (COPS) and the introduction of “get tough” measures such as California’s three strikes statute and the federal Violent Offender Initiative/Truth in Sentencing (VOI/TIS) program that required offenders to serve 75 percent of their sentences for violent offenses in order to receive federal funds for prisons.

⁵ Sources: <http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2004/NC-EST2004-02.xls>, <http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/nat-agesextxt> , <http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/tables/SC-EST2004-02/SC-EST2004-02-06.xls>, and <http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/#state>.

⁶ Sources: http://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof03/00/3C.htm, http://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof03/00/4C.htm , <http://ca.rand.org/stats/popdemo/popraceage.html> , http://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof03/00/3C.htm, http://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof03/00/4C.htm, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_97/95CRIME/95crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_97/96CRIME/96crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_97/97crime/97crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_98/98crime/98cius22.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_99/99crime/99c4_01.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_00/00crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/01crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/pdf/02crime4.pdf, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/st_age_sex.html, and http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/2003_nat_res.html.

⁷ Sources: http://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof03/00/3B.htm , http://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof03/00/4B.htm, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_97/95CRIME/95crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_97/96CRIME/96crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_97/97crime/97crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_98/98crime/98cius22.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_99/99crime/99c4_03.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_00/00crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/01crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/pdf/02crime4.pdf, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec4.pdf, <http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/nat-agesex.txt>, <http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2003/NC-EST2003-02.xls>, and <http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2003/NCEST2003-01.xls>.

⁸ Source: <http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/glance/data/13data.txt>.

⁹ Source: <http://www.cya.ca.gov/research/2004-12YEAR.pdf>.

¹⁰ Source: <http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/joq/jds/QuerySelection.asp> for juvenile halls, <http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/joq/jds/QuerySelection.asp> for juvenile ranches and camps.

¹¹ Source: <http://www.mchdhs.ca.gov/documents/ppt/Teen%20birth%20rate%20press%20release%20based%20on%202000%20Census%205-19-04.ppt>.

¹² The numbers referred to in this section are actually three-year averages, which we have represented as the middle year of the three for discussion purposes. Thus, for example, the 50.3 percent of children represented as living in poverty in 1994 is actually the average percentage of 1993, 1994, and 1995.

¹³

Sources: <http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/liuc95.html>,
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<http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/liuc03.html>.

¹⁴ Sources: <http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/liuc95.html> ,
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¹⁵ Source: <http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/populations/qa01502.asp?qaDate=20020120> .

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