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Results-based Framework for Post-conviction Supervision Recidivism Analysis

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AS RECOMMENDED IN the report produced by IBM Consulting Services in 2004, the *Strategic Assessment of the Federal Probation and Pretrial Services System*,[1] and at the direction of the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) is developing a comprehensive outcome measurement (or results-based) infrastructure for federal probation and pretrial services. The goal of the results-based framework is to allow system stakeholders to measure not only what the federal probation and pretrial services system does, but *how well* we do it. While we plan to enhance the results-based framework to systematically measure each of the four core functions—pretrial services investigations and supervision and presentence investigations and post-conviction supervision— the initial stages of the results-based framework focus heavily on post-conviction supervision because it consumes the largest portion of system resources and is most closely tied to the agency's overarching mission of community safety.

In the goal-setting stage of the results-based framework, system stakeholders updated supervision policies to ensure that recent crime legislation and case law were incorporated. Further, policy developers wove early fundamental research-based principles of "what works" into those policies. For example, supervision policies are heavily influenced by the "risk principle" of evidence-based practices (EBPs), which encourages probation officers to supervise offenders with intensity that is commensurate with their risk to recidivate. The supervision policies set forth the goals of federal post-conviction supervision, and thus are what we hold

ourselves accountable for. These policies clearly articulate the desired outcomes as "execution of the sentence and the protection of the community by reducing the risk and recurrence of crime and maximizing offender success during the period of supervision and beyond."[2]

The goal of supervision in the federal system, now explicit in policy, is the successful completion of the period of supervision during which the offender commits no new crimes; is held accountable for victim, family, community, and other court-imposed responsibilities; and prepares for continued success through improvements in conduct and condition. The emphasis on continued success after the period of supervision acknowledges that fostering long-term behavior change is a key underpinning of effective supervision and that only through long-term behavior change will we rise to the challenge of protecting the community, even beyond the period of supervision.[3]

For most of its history, federal probation has collected data and reported statistics on revocation of supervision for technical violations as well as for new criminal conduct. However, these data alone tell an incomplete story. Evaluating the effectiveness of federal probation's mission to protect the community must also include measurement and analysis of recidivism; that is, how well do we do at minimizing criminal activity both during the period of supervision—and beyond?

After considerable work to build the infrastructure, federal probation and pretrial services is now positioned for the first time in its history to objectively measure new criminal conduct (using data obtained from independent sources), to detect and report statistically meaningful changes over time, and to make apples-to-apples comparisons across districts. We plan to institute processes that regularly and systematically measure new criminal conduct and other important indicators of the effectiveness of federal supervision. In order to accomplish this, the AO has overcome challenges that until now have significantly constrained the ability of corrections agencies to routinely study recidivism on large populations of offenders. In fact, with more than 185,000 offenders included in the study cohort, the AO's first recidivism study performed in the context of outcome measures is unprecedented in size and scope. Never before has a criminal justice agency had the capability to study—and to build upon—such a large cohort of offenders residing in every state, whose new criminal conduct can be studied both during their term of community supervision and beyond.

Until recently, criminal justice agencies were constrained by the practical challenges associated with assembling arrest data. Because arrest data appear in disparate formats in individual state repositories, researchers were required to hand-code arrest data from hard-copy "rap" sheets. This made large-scale research prohibitively expensive, time-consuming, and in many instances impractical. We overcame this problem by developing ways to access criminal records en masse without human intervention, to parse narrative text strings that describe arrests, and to translate those texts into dates and offense codes. To accomplish this, the study team developed software to feed in batches of hundreds of thousands of FBI numbers and state identifiers to Access to Law Enforcement (ATLAS)[4] and retrieve text-based rap sheets. They also developed software to interpret text-based rap sheets into discrete data elements. The result is that re-arrest data are available in computer-readable format suitable for input to sophisticated statistical models. (Last year we learned that the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) has undertaken a similar effort to build a database of criminal history data through automated access and interpretation of rap sheets. In fiscal year 2011, the AO is partnering with BJS on a study that tests their criminal history data assembly protocols. By making data far more readily available than in the past, BJS's database of criminal history, once complete, has the potential to significantly advance the field of criminal recidivism research.)

In 2006, we contracted with Abt Associates to contribute quantitative expertise to the technical and analytic phases of the results-based management framework. Their contribution included the software to parse the text-based rap sheets described above and various studies, including the recidivism studies described below. The recidivism findings reported within this article are based on recent reports they provided to the AO under this contract: *Arrest Rates and Offenses of*

Offenders on Federal Probation and Supervised Release (Rhodes, Dyous, Kling, Hunt, Luallen, and Gaes) and *Post-Supervision Re-Arrest Rates of Offenders following Federal Probation and Supervised Release* (Rhodes, Dyous, Hunt, Kling, Subramanian, Luallen, and Gaes). The first report examines re-arrest rates of offenders after one, two, and three years under supervision. Consistent with our intent to hold ourselves accountable also for long-term positive changes and reduced recidivism *beyond* the period of supervision, the second report examines the re-arrest rate of offenders who have completed their term of supervision for one-, two-, and three-year follow-up periods after supervision has been completed. The following are abstracts from those reports.

Defining Recidivism Measures

The AO has adopted two primary measures of recidivism: arrests for new criminal offenses and charges for new criminal offenses resulting in revocation and return to prison. These measures were adopted in consultation with a panel of experts on measurement methodology formed in March 2004. Members of the panel included the directors of research for the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Federal Judicial Center, and academics from Temple University and the University of Maryland. The panel recommended that the AO adopt the same measures of recidivism used at the Federal Bureau of Prisons because of the large overlap in populations. We have not yet studied in any detail the second measure of recidivism, return to prison for revocation for new criminal conduct, but plan to in future iterations.

Assembling Data for the Studies

The study team assembled data about the supervision terms of federal offenders from the Probation and Pretrial Services Automated Case Tracking System (PACTS) and matched with Sentry records from the Federal Bureau of the Prisons (BOP), data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC), and data from the Census Bureau. They assembled arrest data from ATLAS (Access to Law Enforcement System) and from the FBI's Computerized Criminal History (CCH) data. Arrest data are current through August 2009. The study cohort comprises 185,297 persons, offenders who began active post-conviction supervision between October 1, 2004 and August 2009.

Consistent with the recidivism measures and definitions recommended by the methodology panel, these two studies examined recidivism defined as the *first* arrest for new criminal conduct. Offenders may have multiple arrests following their term of supervision. For this study, we took the first arrest. Additionally, offenders may have multiple arrests on the same day. Where an offender has more than one arrest on the same day, we took the most serious charge. The arrest data were coded into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) codes. The NCIC codes are in order of seriousness and we used this ordering to select the most serious offense when there were multiple arrests on the same day.

Because states vary widely with respect to the fidelity with which they report less serious offenses to their criminal record repositories, the rates are reported in two categories: serious offenses and non-serious offenses. Because most states report felony or equivalent offenses, but may or may not report lower-level offenses consistently, the arrest rates for serious offenses are much less subject to variances in state reporting standards and practices.

There is greater consistency in the reporting of serious crimes because these offenses generally result in booking and fingerprinting. Including less serious crimes in re-arrest statistics would make some probation offices appear to have higher rates than others, because they are located in states that have more inclusive reporting standards. Furthermore, apparent changes in arrest rates over time could be the result of changes in reporting practices. See Figure 1 for an illustration of variances in state reporting. The study had to deal with this problem to allow for meaningful

district-to-district and year-over-year comparisons. The solution was to provide separate sets of tabulations: one for all arrests (regardless of level of offense) and one limited to serious arrests. The statistics presented in this article are limited to serious arrests. Excluding minor offenses in the re-arrest rate does not significantly understate the arrest rate in the aggregate. For example, when minor offenses are included in the arrest rate for offenders within the first three years of supervision, system-wide arrest rates increase by about 4 percent in the first year, 5 percent in the second year, and 6 percent in the third year.

Time at Risk for Re-arrest Under Supervision

The data are for supervision terms that began between October 1, 2004, and August 13, 2009, and the arrest data are current as of August 13, 2009. Consequently, the length of time that offenders in the supervision cohort have to recidivate varies, ranging from less than a month for offenders who started supervision in August 2009 to almost five years for those who started in early FY 2005. So that arrest rates account for time at risk to recidivate, the study team restricted the data to offenders who were at risk to recidivate for one-, two-, and three-year periods.

One-Year Arrest Rate. These statistics include offenders who would have completed at least one year of supervision (before August 2009) according to the supervision terms imposed by the courts, although they may have been on supervision for less than one year because of a new arrest or revocation. These data provide the *one-year arrest rates*. Of those 185,297 offenders in the cohort, we could observe the one-year outcomes for 147,030 offenders.

Two-Year Arrest Rate. These statistics include offenders who would have completed at least two years of supervision, except for the occurrence of a new arrest or revocation. Arrests are cumulative over the two years of supervision. For example, an offender sentenced to two years of federal supervision (before August 2007) was arrested after 6 months. The offender's arrest is included in both the one-year and two-year arrest statistics. In comparison, another offender who was sentenced to only one year of supervision and arrested after six months is included in the one-year arrest statistics. These data provide the *two-year arrest rates.* We could observe the two-year outcomes for 88,283 offenders.

*Three-Year Arrest Rate.*These rates include offenders who would have completed at least three years of supervision, except for the occurrence of a new arrest or revocation. Arrests are cumulative over the three years of supervision for offenders who had sentences of at least three years of supervision. These data provide the *three-year arrest rates*. We could observe the three-year outcomes for 39,652 offenders.

Figure 2 provides the number of offenders serving terms of probation and supervised release (TSR) that entered into the analysis for each year.

Findings: Arrest Rates Under Supervision

The study team found that about one-quarter of the offenders in the study cohort were re-arrested for a serious offense within three years of beginning their supervision term. As shown in Figure 3, less than 11 percent of offenders were arrested within the first year for a serious offense, about 17 percent were arrested within two years, and almost 23 percent were arrested within three years. As expected, TSR offenders have higher overall recidivism rates (24 percent) than probationers (15 percent) over a three-year period.

Types of Offenses

Together drug, violence, and property offenses comprise the majority of the re-arrests. Of the 23 percent re-arrested within three years, drug-related offenses accounted for almost seven percent of the first re-arrest events, violent offenses almost six percent, and property offenses about five percent. All other types of offenses are minimally represented in the remaining five percent. Figure 4 provides the distribution of arrest rates by each offense category for each of the three years in the study.

The study team also analyzed the extent to which variances in recidivism exist between offenders serving probation supervision terms compared to those serving terms of supervised release. Figure 5 provides arrest rates by each offense category for each of the three years for probation and TSR. As shown in the table, offenders serving terms of supervised release have higher re-arrest rates for serious offenses (e.g., drugs, violence, firearms, and sex offenses) than do offenders on probation. We would expect this, because, compared with offenders under probation, offenders serving TSR have more extensive criminal records and other characteristics that put them at increased risk to recidivate.

Overall, offenders serving TSR commit crimes that are more serious than those serving terms of probation. Among offenders arrested for a serious crime, those serving TSR are more frequently arrested for violent offenses (almost 26 percent of all arrests within three years) and drug-related offenses (32 percent of all arrests) compared with offenders serving terms of probation (about 20 and 22 percent for violent and drug law violations, respectively). Offenders serving terms of probation are much more frequently arrested for property crimes (about 35 percent of all arrests for probationers compared with only 21 percent for TSR offenders). Offenders serving terms of TSR are not only re-arrested in higher proportions than probation offenders, they are re-arrested for the more serious crimes.

Re-Arrest Rates of Offenders Following Completion of Supervision

In keeping with our intent to measure and hold ourselves accountable for long-term reduced recidivism *beyond* the period of supervision, the study team also examined the re-arrest rate of offenders who have completed their term of supervision at defined follow-up periods. For this purpose, the study team examined recidivism defined as the *first* arrest for a *serious* criminal offense following the successful completion of supervision for one-, two-, and three-year follow-up periods. In this context, we define "successful completion of supervision" as termination of supervision absent revocation for technical violations or new criminal conduct. In other words, offenders whose term of supervision ran to expiration or who were granted early termination were included in this analysis. Of those offenders in the study cohort, 59,929 completed their supervision terms successfully.

Time to Re-arrest Following End of Supervision Term

As of the time the data were assembled from PACTS and the arrest data were assembled from criminal record repositories, 31 percent of offenders in the study cohort had completed their supervision terms successfully. Of those who successfully completed supervision, the length of time that they have to recidivate varies, ranging from less than a month for some offenders to almost four years for others. The statistics presented only include offenders for whom the study team was able to observe arrest outcomes for at least one year post-supervision, i.e., they completed supervision prior to August 13, 2008. So that arrest rates account for time at risk to recidivate, re-arrest rates for one-, two-, and three-year follow-up periods are tabulated separately.

One-Year Post-Supervision Arrest Rate. Offenders included in the one-year arrest rate completed their term of supervision by August 13, 2008, and therefore have at least *one year of post-supervision follow-up.* Re-arrest rates are based on the first year of post-supervision

follow-up. For example, an offender who completed supervision on July 13, 2008, is included in the one-year rate because more than 12 months of follow-up time exist. In comparison, an offender who completed supervision on July 13, 2009 is not included, since only one month of follow-up time exists. We could observe one-year outcomes for 35,270 offenders.

Two-Year Post-Supervision Arrest Rate. Offenders included completed their term of supervision by August 13, 2007, and therefore have at least *two years of post-supervision follow-up.* Re-arrest rates are based on the two years of post-supervision follow-up. We could observe two-year outcomes for 14,266 offenders. Arrests are cumulative over the two years of follow-up.

Three-Year Post-Supervision Arrest Rate. Offenders completed their term of supervision by August 13, 2006, and therefore have at least *three years of post-supervision follow-up.* Re-arrest rates are based on the three years of post-supervision follow-up. The study team could observe three-year outcomes for 4,398 offenders. Arrests are cumulative over the three years of follow-up for offenders who were released prior to August 13, 2006.

Figure 6 provides the number of probation and TSR offenders that entered into the post-supervision follow-up period for each year.

Findings—Post-Supervision Re-arrests

The study team found that among those arrested after successfully completing their terms of supervision, six percent were arrested within the first year, about 12 percent were arrested within two years, and almost 18 percent were arrested within three years. See Figure 7.

Types of Offenses

Figure 8 shows the distribution of re-arrest rates by each offense category for each of the three follow-up periods. The types of offenses for arrests incurred are consistent with those incurred during the first three years of supervision; that is, drug law, property, and violence offenses comprise the largest proportion of the arrests. Of the 17.7 percent of offenders who were arrested within three years of completing supervision, 5.5 percent of offenders had an arrest for a drug offense, 4.5 percent had an arrest for a property offense, and 4.4 percent were re-arrested for a violent crime.

Figure 9 provides re-arrest rates by offense category for each of the three years for probation and TSR. As shown in the table, offenders who completed terms of supervised release have higher overall recidivism rates for serious offenses than do offenders who completed terms of probation. Moreover, they have higher re-arrest rates for all types of offenses.

Possible Statistical Biases Associated with the Post-Supervision Re-arrest Rates

Because the arrest rates include only offenders who successfully completed their term of supervision, the study team explored whether the post-supervision arrest rates are subject to statistical biases due to over-representation of offenders who are presumably the "best" offenders. This potentially biases the sample by eliminating the higher-risk offenders who were re-arrested or were revoked during their term of supervision. In fact, offenders who were eliminated have higher Risk Prediction Index (RPI) scores[5] on average (Mean = 5.13) compared to the offenders who completed their supervision successfully (Mean = 2.65).

The study team investigated another potential bias. Because the typical term of supervision is about three years, slightly more than half (51 percent) of offenders in the cohort are still on supervision. Consequently, offenders who have shorter supervision terms (either because they

had shorter terms imposed or because they were granted early termination) are likely over-represented in the population of offenders observed for re-arrests after supervision. Again, those offenders that are still on supervision and thus are excluded from the tabulations may be among the "worst" offenders and would have higher rates of recidivism, including severity of crimes for which they were re-arrested, than the "best" offenders included in the tabulations.

To examine the second possibility, the study team tabulated the re-arrest rates separately for four cohorts of offenders: offenders who entered supervision in fiscal years 2005 (Cohort 1), 2006 (Cohort 2), 2007 (Cohort 3), and 2008 (Cohort 4). We expected to see a difference in re-arrest rates over time, especially between the earliest and latest cohorts. However, the study team did not see such a pattern. Moreover, the study team did not find that re-arrest rates by offense type and severity over time for these four cohorts varied appreciably.

On the premise that higher-risk offenders complete their supervision terms later than lower-risk offenders, the study team expected that the earlier cohorts would have higher average RPI scores than the later cohorts. That is, they expected that lower-risk offenders would be over-represented in the later cohorts. To investigate, they examined RPI scores for offenders who were eligible for one-, two-, and three-year arrest rates. However, the team did not see any patterns in the data that would indicate that the cohorts vary over time in terms of their risks.

Although the analyses thus far do not reveal bias in the post-supervision follow-up re-arrest statistics, the study team nevertheless advises a cautious interpretation until further data are available.

Conclusion

We have made considerable progress in understanding the extent and nature of recidivism in federal post-conviction supervision. In the past few years, we have begun a framework upon which we can continue to build that informs our stakeholders of the progress that we are making towards achieving federal supervision's most salient outcome—reducing recidivism during the period of supervision and beyond. We are positioned to enhance our framework to measure and report on other important interim and ultimate outcomes. This will tell us, at least in large part, how *well* we are doing.

However, perhaps the more important—and of course, far more complex—question is *why*. The next phases of the results-based framework seek to answer some of these questions as we explore the causal relationships between supervision interventions and the intermediate and ultimate outcomes. While we still have much work to do in this regard, we have built an infrastructure that supports statistical models designed to isolate supervision interventions and practices that improve offender outcomes.

As we continue to implement evidence-based practices (EBPs), we will rely on our data to inform us as to what is producing desired outcomes and what is not. Our challenge remains to systematically and regularly evaluate our outcomes and to incorporate our knowledge into practice.

Endnotes

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# Results-based Framework for Post-conviction Supervision Recidivism Analysis

Figures

Figure 1.

Variances in Reporting Minor and Major Crimes by State

FIGURE 1.

Variances in Reporting Minor and Major Crimes by State

The seriousness of reported arrests committed by offenders in the study ranges from rather minor offenses such as public order offenses to serious violent crimes against persons such as assault. Figure 1 shows the distribution of arrest rates (for all arrests after October 1, 2004) by offense severity (minor versus serious) for all states. As the figure demonstrates, states seem to vary with respect to the fidelity with which they report arrests for relatively minor crimes. For example, minor offenses account for over 77 percent of all arrests in New Hampshire to a little more than 10 percent of all arrests in Pennsylvania.

Figure 2.

| Number of Probation and TSR Offenders in the Analysis			
Supervision Type	**1 Year**	**2 Years**	**3 Years**
Probation	26,709	13,816	6,120
TSR	120,321	74,467	33,532
Total	**147,030**	**88,283**	**39,652**

Note: Numbers do not sum across columns because year 3 is a subset of year 2, and year 2 is a subset of year 1.

Figure 3.
Arrest Rates for Serious Offenses by Year for Probation and TSR Offenders During Supervision

FIGURE 3.
Arrest Rates for Serious Offenses by Year for Probation and TSR Offenders During Supervision

Figure 4.
Arrest rates for Serious Offenses by Year and Offense Category*

	% of Offenders with Arrest		
	1 Year	**2 Years**	**3 Years**
Offense category	**(n=147,030)**	**(n=88,283)**	**(n=39,652)**

Drugs	2.9%	5.1%	6.9%
Violence	2.4%	4.2%	5.7%
Property	2.4%	4.0%	5.2%
Unknown	0.7%	1.1%	1.3%
Immigration	0.5%	0.7%	0.8%
Escape/Obstruction	0.4%	0.6%	0.7%
Firearms	0.3%	0.5%	0.6%
Sex Offense	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%
Public Order	0.2%	0.4%	0.5%
Other	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%
Total	**10.3%**	**17.1%**	**22.6%**

*Note: Percentage totals are arrived at by adding the individual percentages carried out to several decimal points.

Figure 5.
Arrest Rates for Serious Offenses by Year and Offense Category for Probation and TSR Offenders*

	% of Offenders with Arrest					
	TSR			Probation		
	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years
Offense category	**(n=120,321)**	**(n=74,467)**	**(n=33,532)**	**(n=26,709)**	**(n=13,816)**	**(n=6,120)**
Drugs	3.3%	5.6%	7.6%	1.5%	2.3%	3.4%
Violence	2.7%	4.5%	6.1%	1.2%	2.2%	3.0%
Property	2.5%	4.0%	5.1%	2.2%	3.8%	5.4%
Unknown	0.7%	1.1%	1.4%	0.4%	0.7%	1.0%
Escape/Obstruction	0.4%	0.6%	0.8%	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%
Immigration	0.6%	0.7%	0.8%	0.4%	0.7%	0.8%
Firearms	0.4%	0.6%	0.7%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%
Sex Offense	0.3%	0.5%	0.6%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%
Public Order	0.2%	0.4%	0.5%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%

Other	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	0.3%	0.4%
Total	**11.2%**	**18.3%**	**23.9%**	**6.5%**	**10.9%**	**15.3%**

*Note: Percentage totals are arrived at by adding the individual percentages carried out to several decimal points.

Figure 6.
Number of Probation and TSR Offenders in the Analysis

| Supervision Type	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years
Probation	13,463	7,115	2,577
TSR	21,807	7,151	1,821
Total	**35,270**	**14,266**	**4,398**

Note: Numbers do not sum across columns because year 1 is a subset of year 2, and year 2 is a subset of year 3.

Figure 7.
Arrest Rates for Serious Offenses by Year for Probation and TSR Offenders Following Supervision

FIGURE 7.
Arrest Rates for Serious Offenses by Year for Probation and TSR Offenders Following Supervision

Figure 8.
Post-Supervision Re-Arrest Rates for Serious Offenses by Year and Offense Category*

	% of Offenders with Arrest		
	1 Year	**2 Years**	**3 Years**
Offense category	**(n=35,270)**	**(n=14,266)**	**(n=4,398)**
Drugs	1.9%	3.6%	5.5%
Property	1.4%	3.0%	4.5%
Violence	1.6%	2.9%	4.4%
Unknown	0.3%	0.6%	1.1%
Immigration	0.3%	0.5%	0.7%
Firearms	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%
Public Order	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%
Sex Offense	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%
Other	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%
Escape/Obstruction	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Total Arrest Rate	**6.0%**	**11.6%**	**17.7%**

*Note: Percentage totals are arrived at by adding the individual percentages carried out to several decimal points.

Figure 9.
Post-Supervision Re-Arrest Rates for Serious Offenses by Year and Offense Category for Probation and TSR Offenders*

	% of Offenders with Arrest					
	TSR			Probation		
	1 Year	**2 Years**	**3 Years**	**1 Year**	**2 Years**	**3 Years**
Offense category	**(n=21,807)**	**(n=7,151)**	**(n=1,821)**	**(n=13,463)**	**(n=7,115)**	**(n=2,577)**
Drugs	2.1%	4.6%	7.9%	1.4%	2.6%	3.9%

Property	1.6%	3.7%	6.0%	1.2%	2.3%	3.5%
Violence	1.8%	3.4%	5.5%	1.2%	2.3%	3.6%
Unknown	0.3%	0.9%	1.5%	0.2%	0.4%	0.8%
Immigration	0.3%	0.7%	1.0%	0.2%	0.4%	0.5%
Firearms	0.2%	0.3%	0.6%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%
Public Order	0.2%	0.5%	0.5%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%
Sex Offense	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
Miscellaneous	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
Escape/Obstruction	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
Total Arrest Rate	**6.9%**	**14.7%**	**24.1%**	**4.6%**	**8.5%**	**13.2%**

*Note: Percentage totals are arrived at by adding the individual percentages carried out to several decimal points.

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Endnotes

Results-based Framework for Post-conviction Supervision Recidivism Analysis

1. *Strategic Assessment of Federal Probation and Pretrial Services, 2004*. Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center (http://jnet/Probation_and_Pretrial_Services/Strategic_Assessment.html).

2. *Guide to Judiciary Policy*, Volume 8, Part E, The Supervision of Federal Offenders (Monograph 109).

3. *Federal Probation*, Volume 72, *Results-Based Management in Federal Probation and Pretrial Services*, September 2008, John M. Hughes.

4. ATLAS is a software program developed by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts that provides a browser-based user interface for performing criminal record checks. It is widely used by probation and pretrial services officers to perform criminal record checks on defendants and offenders for supervision and investigation purposes.

5. The Risk Prediction Index (RPI) is an instrument used by officers to estimate the likelihood that an offender will be arrested or have supervision revoked during his or her term of supervision. It is a statistical model developed by the Federal Judicial Center at the request of the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law and approved by the Judicial Conference in March 1997. The model has been extensively tested and has been shown to be a strong predictor of the risk of recidivism for all federal offenders. "Recidivism" is defined as any revocation of supervised release, probation, or parole; arrest under federal or state jurisdiction; or absconding from supervision. RPI scores range

from 0 to 9, with 9 indicating a higher likelihood of violation. Scores of 0 or 1 indicate that the offender has a very high likelihood of success (i.e., over 90 percent of offenders in these categories do *not* recidivate).

Alternatives to Pretrial Detention: Southern District of Iowa, A Case Study

1. Performance and outcome measure improvements identified using data extracted from the Probation and Pretrial Services Automated Case Tracking System (PACTS) database as detailed in the Findings section of this report.

2. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(c)(1)(B).

3. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(e) contains three categories of criminal offenses that give rise to a rebuttable presumption that "no condition or combination of conditions" will (1) "reasonably assure" the safety of any other person and the community if the defendant is released; or (2) "reasonably assure" the appearance of the defendant as required and "reasonably assure" the safety of any other person and the community if the defendant is released.

4. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(g).

5. An illustrative list of conditions is set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142 (c)(1)(B)(i through xiv), which gives the judicial officer authority to impose conditions not specifically enumerated so long as the same serve the purposes set out in § 3142(c)(1)(B).

6. VanNostrand, Marie and Gena Keebler. "Our Journey Toward Pretrial Justice" in *Federal Probation,* Volume 71, Number 2 (September 2007), pp. 20-25.

7. *Putting Public Safety First: 13 Strategies for Successful Supervision and Reentry* (The Pew Center on the States, 2008).

8. VanNostrand, Marie and Gena Keebler. *Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court: For the Purpose of Expanding the Use of Alternatives to Detention* (Department of Justice, Office of Federal Detention Trustee, 2009).

9. VanNostrand, Marie and Gena Keebler. *Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court: For the Purpose of Expanding the Use of Alternatives to Detention* (Department of Justice, Office of Federal Detention Trustee, 2009), see page 36.

Workforce Development Program: A Pilot Study of its Impact in the U.S. Probation Office, District of Delaware

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2. The sample includes individuals on community probation as well as individuals on